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In the Supreme Court of the State of Utah 
RULON ROMRELL, 
Plaintiff and Respondent, 
vs. 
W. W. CLYDE AND COMPANY, 
Defendant and Appellant. 
STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE 
The defendant-appellant's statement is substantially ac-
curate excepting as to how the animals got under the fence 
at a cut made by defendant-appellant, as there was no evi-
dence that the animals "crawled under the fence and the 
jury found there was no acceptance of the work of the 
defendant-appellant. 
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT 
Defendant-appellant's statement as to the disposition is 
accurate. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Defendant-appellant's statement is correct with respect to 
the relief sought on appeal. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Defendant-appellant's statement of facts is substantially 
correct as far as it goes, but some salient facts are left out. 
The fence in the general area of the cut in question was not 
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completed by the contractor until long after the damage to 
plaintiff-respondent (Tr. 62 - p. 44, lines 16-30; p. 45, lines 
1-23), (Tr. 62 - p. 14, lines 15-30; p. 15, lines 1-18). At the 
time the cow and the bull got out and died, the fence had 
not been completed. The fence had not been fastened down 
according to the plans and specifications and had been left 
unfastened at the bottom (Tr. 62 - p. 34, lines 9-27). The 
highway construction itself was not completed until long 
after the damage to plaintiff-respondent (Tr. 61 - p. 42, lines 
12-30, p. 43, lines 1-30, p. 44, lines 1-10). 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE EVIDENCE FULLY SUPPORTS THE VERDICT OF 
THE JURY AND THE JUDGMENT OF THE COURT 
THEREON. 
The jury found under proper instructions from the court 
that the defendant-appellant was negligent and that its neg-
ligence was the proximate cause of the injury to the plain-
tiff-respondent. The jury found that the defendant-appellant 
was negligent in either failing to fasten the fence, which would 
be a failure to follow the specifications (Tr. 61 - p. 33, lines 
25-30, p. 34, lines 1-11, and Tr. 61 -p . 21, lines 1-13, Tr. 61 -
p. 11, lines 3-10), or in failing to place an obstruction in the 
cut under the fence, which any reasonable person would know 
was necessary to prevent damage to the animals regardless of 
whether such action was specified or not. Or the jury may 
have determined the negligence of the defendant upon both 
issues. The issue of contributory negligence raised by the de-
fendant-appellant was determined by the jury against its 
claims. 
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POINT II 
THERE IS SOME EVIDENCE THAT THE DEFENDANT-
APPELLANT ATTEMPTED TO DIG THE TRENCH UNDER 
THE FENCE PURSUANT TO DIRECTIONS OF A STATE 
EMPLOYEE, BUT IF IT DID SO IT DID IT NEGLIGENTLY 
FOR WHICH IT SHOULD BE HELD RESPONSIBLE. 
POINT III 
THERE WAS NO PRACTICAL OR OTHER ACCEPTANCE 
OF THE HIGHWAY CONSTRUCTION WORK INCUMBENT 
UPON THE DEFENDANT-APPELLANT WHICH WOULD 
INSULATE IT FROM LIABILITY TO PLAINTIFF-RES-
PONDENT FOR HIS DAMAGES. 
Inasmuch as the defendant-appellant treats the same sub-
ject matter under its Points I and II in its Brief as we would 
treat under Points II and III, Points II and III are treated in 
this Brief together. 
The defendant-appellant cites the case of Black vs. Peter 
Kiewit Son's Inc., 94 Idaho 755, 497, Pacific 2d 1056 (1972) 
in support of its view that a contractor is not liable to a 
third person where the contractor has performed its work in 
accordance with its plans and specifications. In that case it 
was stipulated that the respondent contractor had constructed 
the whole highway section in accordance with the plans and 
specifications, and that the State Highway Engineer had 
accepted the work as completed. This case involved the 
completion of a whole section of road and the acceptance 
thereof by the proper state authority. How different that is 
from the present case. It was pointed out by the court in the 
Idaho case that at no time after the work was accepted by 
the state did the contractor maintain or control such highway 
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section, but that responsibility was left with the state. In the 
present case, the defendant-appellant didn't fasten the fence 
in accordance with specifications (Tr. 62 - p. 34, lines 9-27), 
(Tr. 61 - p. 33, lines 25-30, and p. 34, lines 1-11). That is 
what the jury believed and such belief was substantially sup-
ported by the evidence. 
The defendant-appellant cites annotations in 13 A.L.R. 2d 
195 and 58 A.L.R. 2d 869 to support its view that where the 
contractor performs his work according to plans and specifi-
cations there may be no liability imposed upon him for 
damage resulting from such construction. Interestingly, both 
annotations are entitled "Negligence of building or construc-
tion contractor as ground for liability upon his part for in-
jury or damage to third person occurring after completion 
and acceptance of the work". It was further pointed out in 
the annotations that they did not deal with the liability of 
the contractor for negligence resulting in injury or damage 
to third persons during the performance or progress of the 
work. In examining the cases cited in the annotations, the 
work involved and not just isolated parts thereof had been 
completed and accepted by the owner. In the present case 
there had been a fence constructed although later completed 
long after the damage (Tr. 62 - p. 44, lines 16-30, p. 45, lines 
1-23), (Tr. 62 - p. 14, lines 15-30, p. 15, lines 1-18). The 
construction of the fence was one of the first things to be 
done in a road construction job and an infinitesimal part of 
the whole road job. None of the cases that the writer has 
been able to find would imply an acceptance of a small part 
of a highway construction job, when the contractor remains 
in control. 
The case of Haynes vs. Norfolk Bridge and Construction 
Company, 126 Nebraska 281, 253 N.W. 344 (1934) cited by 
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defendant-appellant involved a contract for the construction 
of twin culverts. The evidence showed that the last work was 
done upon that project by the defendant Norfolk Company 
on the 18th of July 1930, and at that time the State's Project 
Engineer and the foreman of the Norfolk Company together 
estimated and agreed upon the yardage and the engineer in 
his book kept for the purpose stated that the work was finish-
ed and completed, and a day or two after that the Norfolk 
Company removed all of its equipment and entered upon 
work of construction on another project several miles distant 
from the scene of the twin culverts and upon an entirely 
different contract. The Court pointed out that the record 
disclosed that there was also a second contract between the 
state and another contractor, the latter to do the work of 
grading and servicing on the first project after the two culverts 
were installed. The injury in this case occurred after the 
total completion of the contract of the defendant and on or 
about July 30, 1930. This case involved a total completion of 
a contract and the acceptance by the state and the Court held 
that the defendant contractor was insulated from liability 
because of the acceptance after the total completion of the 
job. That is not at all the case on appeal before this Court. 
The case of Rengstorf vs. Winston Bros. Col, 167 Minn., 
290, 208 N.W. 995 (1926) cited by defendant-appellant 
involved a situation where a grading contractor contracted to 
construct certain grades but not to construct guard rails. The 
injury occurred when an accident happened because no guard 
rails were constructed. The construction of the guard rails 
was not in any way the obligation of the contractor. The 
Court pointed out that the defendant contractor's whole 
contract had been completed and accepted prior to the in-
jury and the contractor was insulated from liability. 
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The case of Reynolds vs. Manley, 223 Ark. 314, 265 S.W. 
2d 714 (1954) also cited by defendant-appellant also in-
volved another situation where the whole contract of the 
defendant had been completed and accepted on May 22, 
1951, and an injury occurred on October 27, 1951. The 
State had had the responsibility for the upkeep and mainten-
ance of the road long before the injury occurred. 
The case of Leininger vs. Steams-Roger Manufacturing 
Company, 17 Utah 2d 37, 404 P. 2d 33 (1965), also involved 
a situation where there had been the completion of a contract 
for the installation of a fan four years prior to an injury re-
sulting from the dismantling and repair of an exhaust fan. 
The fan had been constructed according to the instructions 
of the employer of the independent contractor. The whole 
contract for the installation of the fan had been completed 
four years before according to the instructions of the employ-
er. There was no claim in this case of any negligence on the 
part of the defendant contractor. That case also is entirely 
different form the facts of the present case where there was 
a piecemeal construction of a fence by a contractor whose 
responsibility it was to build a whole highway and whose 
negligence was proved by the evidence. 
The defendant has cited no cases or authorities supporting 
the view that an acceptance or even an implied acceptance 
can be effected piecemeal. In other words, to follow defend-
ant's argument to. its logical conclusion, if ten feet of fence 
on a highway project had been constructed by a contractor 
on a road building contract just begun and the balance of a 
mile of fence was changed and altered, then there would be 
no liability on the part of a contractor if damage resulted 
from the faulty construction of a ten-foot strip of fence 
while the contractor was working on and was in control of 
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the highway job. That cannot be the law and the cases do not 
support that view. 
In the case Leininger vs. Steams-Roger Manufacturing Com-
pany», 17 Utah 2d 37, 404 P. 2d 33 (1965) cited by defendant-
appellant, supra, this Court acknowledged its familiarity with 
the old rule and the modern view. In that case, the Court 
applied the modern view with the limitation that the contract-
or is not liable if he merely carried out the plans, specifica-
tions and directions given him, at least when the plans are not 
so obviously dangerous that no reasonable man would follow 
them. 
We submit that even under the doctrine of the Leininger 
case, supra, and disregarding the fact that in that case there 
had been an acceptance of the entire contract of the defend-
ant four years before, and assuming the completion of the 
entire highway project in the area by defendant-appellant 
Clyde, the jury could have found for the plaintiff as it did 
base on either of the two specifications of negligence, (1) 
defendant-appellant's failure to fasten the fence pursuant to 
specifications, and/or (2) failure to provide an obstruction in 
the cut under the fence. If the jury's finding of negligence 
was based on the failure to fasten the fence it was proper 
because this would not be work done in accordance with the 
plans and specifications. If the jury's finding of negligence 
was based on defendant-appellant's failure to place an ob-
struction under the fence in the cut to prevent the animals 
from going under the fence it was also proper. Even when 
specifications are furnished, a contractor is not immune from 
liability merely because he follows the specifications if his 
work creates a situation which is so clearly dangerous that a 
reasonable and prudent man would not simply leave the work 
in a dangerous condition, which was the case here. 
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The jury was instructed that a verdict could not be re-
turned against the defendant-appellant if the loss to the 
animals occurred after the defendant-appellant had completed 
its work on or about the fence and the same was accepted by 
the state. That instruction was certainly more favorable to 
the defendant-appellant than it should be. The jury did return 
a verdict against the defendant and therefore had to have 
found that the work was not completed and accepted before 
the loss of the animals. 
Whether or not the work was completed and accepted 
before the animals died was clearly a question of fact and 
since there was evidence produced on both sides of the issue, 
it was properly submitted to the jury. Defendant-appellant's 
argument, therefore, that the Court should have instructed, 
as a matter of law, that there had been an acceptance of the 
work is clearly erroneous. The issue, rather, is whether the 
jury's finding is supported by the evidence. 
Both of defendant-appellant's witnesses on the issue, 
Lundell and Corless, testified that they had not accepted the 
work and turned it over to the State (Tr. 61 - p. 43, lines 
1-30, p. 44, lines 1-10). There was also testimony by Mr. 
Corless that there was some work left for the contractor to do 
on the fence after May 22, 1972, the date appellant alleges it 
completed its final work on the fence (Tr. 61 - p. 36, lines 
1-23). 
In the rather extensive annotation in 38 A.L.R. 403 en-
titled "Personal liability of contractor in respect of injuries 
sustained by persons other than the contractor during the 
progress of the stipulated work" the general doctrine is stated 
on pages 495-496 as follows: 
"In this monograph it is proposed to review the cases 
which illustrate the operation of the general doctrine 
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that an independent contractor is responsible for any 
wrongful acts that may be committed by himself or his 
servants while the stipulated work is in progress. In 
respect of the responsibility thus imposed upon him, 
there is an essential difference between his position and 
that of a servant. 
"The ground upon which this responsibility is based is 
the implied duty which the law casts upon him, as the 
person in control of the work, to see that the rights of 
other persons are not injuriously affected by its perform-
ance. 
"The responsibility so imputed extends not only to the 
work specified in the contract itself, but also to any 
additional work which the contractor undertakes in 
compliance with a direction given by the employer, act-
ing in the exercise of a right expressly reserved in the 
contract, or which he voluntarily agrees to execute in 
pursuance of an agreement, while the contract is in 
course of performance. 
"The doctrine that the independent status of a contract-
or is not destroyed by the employer's reservation of a 
right to exercise over the performance of the work a 
degree of control which does not extend to direction in 
respect of details obviously involves the corollary that a 
contractor must answer for his own tortious acts and 
those of his servants, although an agent was deputed by 
the employer to superintend the work, and see that the 
terms of the contract were complied with." 
The work on the highway in the pertinent area had just 
begun and the defendant-appellant is responsible for the 
damages resulting. 
POINT IV 
THE APPELLANT-CONTRACTOR IS RESPONSIBLE TO 
THE PLAINTIFF RESPONDENT FOR DAMAGES RE-
SULTING TO PLAINTIFF BY REASON OF THE NEG-
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LIGENCE OF THE APPELLANT CONTRACTOR. 
As shown by the previous argument and the authorities 
cited by the defendant-appellant, the jury's verdict should 
stand under the facts and the law. There is, however, a further 
development in extending the doctrine advanced in the case 
of MacPherson v. Buick Motor Company, 217N. Y. 382, 111 
N.E. 1050, L.R.A. 1916F, 696. This extention is set forth so 
vividly in the case of Tomchik, et al. v. Julian, et al, (Calif-
ornia) 340 P. 2d 72, which says: 
"The rule that a general contractor is not liable for in-
juries to third persons resulting from his negligence in 
construction of the work after the work is completed 
and accepted by the owner is no longer the law; the 
modern tendency being to hold building contractor to 
the general standard of reasonable care for the protection 
of anyone who may reasonably be endangered by neg-
ligence even after acceptance of the work." 
To the same effect are the law review articles in the follow-
ing law reviews: 41 Tex. L. Rev. 599, (1963); 42 Va. L. Rev. 
403 (1956); 43 Marq. L. Rev. 252 (1959); 15 Okl. L. Rev. 68 
1962). Also, see annotation in 58 A.L.R. 2d 865. 
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CONCLUSION 
In any event, the appellant contractor in the case before 
this Court should be held liable on any theory adopted be-
cause of the negligence of the defendant-appellant and be-
cause the injury occurred while the contractor was in full 
control of the highway facility and long before it was com-
pleted and accepted and the verdict of the jury and Judgment 
•entered thereon should be affirmed. 
Respectfully submitted, 
PHILLIP V. CHRISTENSEN, for 
CHRISTENSEN, TAYLOR & MOODY 
Attorneys for Defendant-Respondent 
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